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TAKING AWAY AN EMPLOYER’S FREE PASS: MAKING
THE CASE FOR A MORE SOPHISTICATED SEX-PLUS
ANALYSIS IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
Heather M. Kolinsky*†
INTRODUCTION
“[D]iscrimination today rarely operates in isolated states of mind;
rather, it is often influenced, enabled, even encouraged by structures,
practices, and opportunities of the organizations within which groups and
individuals work.”1 It is easy to identify discrimination when an employer
has a hiring policy that does not allow women with small children to be
hired as employees but does allow men with small children to be hired and
women without children to be hired.2 It is more difficult to identify
discrimination when a woman’s job changes subtly, or her performance
reviews become more negative, after she becomes a mother.3 The latter is
not overt, it is influenced by social constructs, outdated stereotypes, and
presumptions about what it means to be a mother. Moreover, at its core,
such discrimination presumes that being a mother has a negative
connotation in terms of participation in the workplace. This phenomenon
has encouraged many to embrace a slower employment trajectory for
working mothers, the “mommy track”;4 however, at the same time tacit
acceptance of a mommy track has washed over onto scores of working
women who don’t want motherhood to hinder career progress.5 In a sense,
* Heather M. Kolinsky, J.D., Rutgers University–Camden, B.A., Stetson University, is an
Associate Professor of Law at Barry University Law School in Orlando, Florida.
† Thanks to Patrick Burton and Richard Robbins, my research assistants, for their excellent
research and citation support; Professor Dan O’Gorman for his editorial advice; and to Professor Pat
Tolan for being such a wonderful mentor, editor, and friend.
1. Thomas H. Barnard & Adrienne L. Rapp, Pregnant Employees, Working Mothers and the
Workplace—Legislation, Social Change and Where We Are Today, 22 J.L. & HEALTH 197, 237 (2009)
(alteration in original) (quoting Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a
Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 128 (2003)).
2. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring) (per
curiam) (holding that under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employer may not refuse to hire
women with small children while hiring men with small children).
3. See, e.g., Fuller v. GTE Corp., 926 F. Supp. 653 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (dismissing plaintiff’s
claim of employment discrimination due to a hostile work environment towards recent mothers because
plaintiff failed to show fathers were not similarly treated); Bass v. Chem. Banking Corp., No. 94 Civ.
8833, 1996 WL 374151 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1996) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim of employment
discrimination because plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of failure-to-promote where
promotion was given to another female, albeit without children).
4. Virginia Postrel, ‘Mommy Track’ Without Shame, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704461304576216651515154140.html.
5. Id.; Kimberly Palmer, The New Mommy Track: More Mothers Win Flextime at Work, and
Hubbies’ Help (Really!) at Home, U.S. N EWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 3, 2007, http://www.usnews.com/
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presumptions about working mothers are built upon similar stereotypes
about women’s inadequacies in the workplace generally.6
Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that it is appropriate to review
Title VII discrimination claims under a construct of “sex plus” where an
individual alleges discrimination based upon a protected characteristic, sex,
plus a fundamental right or immutable characteristic.7 Sex-plus theory
posits that “[i]t is impermissible to treat men characterized by some
additional characteristic more or less favorably than women with the same
added characteristic.”8 In that vein, the Supreme Court and other federal
courts have recognized that sex “plus” being a parent of small children may
support a claim of sex discrimination, but those same courts have refused to
recognize sex “plus” breastfeeding as a basis for sex discrimination because
men do not breastfeed.9 This differential treatment in the eyes of the law
occurs solely because the “fundamental right” or “immutable characteristic”
must be shared by members of both sexes even where the characteristic or
right being challenged might be exclusively female.10
It is not just the definition of sex plus that drives this type of
dichotomy. It also depends in large part on how the issue is framed. Thus,
when the Supreme Court in General Electric v. Gilbert chose to frame a
question of disability insurance for pregnancy as a question of excluding a
medical condition versus recognizing that pregnancy was uniquely female,
it was able to side-step sex discrimination jurisprudence.11 When the
usnews/biztech/articles/070826/3mommy_print.htm; Lisa Belkin, Fired From the ‘Mommy Track,’ N.Y.
TIMES MOTHERLODE: A DVENTURES IN PARENTING BLOG (Mar. 26, 2010, 4:00 PM),
http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/fired-from-the-mommy-track/.
6. But, conversely, all women are considered mothers, even if it is only their potential for
motherhood that is being judged. “Women may not be identified as mothers, for not all women are or
want to be mothers. But women-as-a-caste behave as they do because most are mothers.” Rebecca
Korzec, Working on the “Mommy-Track”: Motherhood and Women Lawyers, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.
J. 117, 121 (1997) (quoting MARILYN FRENCH, THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN 199 (1992)). Sara Ruddick
notes that while men and non-mothers may also be mothers in the sense that they engage in maternal
work, “the practices and cultural representations of mothering” are conceptually linked to women. SARA
RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE 40–41 (1989).
7. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544.
8. Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Fisher v. Vassar
Coll., 66 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 1995), as amended 70 F.3d 1420, 1428 (2d Cir. 1995)).
9. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544; Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 310.
10. Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 310–11; see Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108
F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that a female employee failed to show differential treatment
from similarly situated members of the opposite sex, as required for a sex-plus claim).
11. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135 (1976). Even though Gilbert was ultimately
overruled when Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the ghost of Gilbert remains as
some courts still use this kind of logic when applying sex plus—focusing on the patent policy rather
than latent impacts on protected groups of women such as breastfeeding mothers. See Derungs v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 374 F.3d 428, 435 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that the plaintiffs incorrectly assumed that
the comparability analysis used by the Supreme Court in Gilbert was completely obliterated in all

2011]

A More Sophisticated Sex-Plus Analysis

329

Gilbert Court did not apply the sex-plus legal framework to the claim
presented, the approach was at odds with the earlier Supreme Court
decision in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., where a subclass of women,
those who were mothers with small children, could maintain a sex-plus
claim because they were treated differently than men with small children
and, in practice, were treated differently than women without small
children.12 The Court in Gilbert should have focused on the policy’s effect
on women as a group, both those that were pregnant as well as those who
could become pregnant, but it chose not to do so. The legacy of Phillips is
that if there is no comparator class among those of the opposite sex, then a
woman cannot maintain a claim under the sex-plus analysis.13 Gilbert did
not apply Phillips because the Court chose not to approach the issue as one
of discrimination against any particular group; instead, the Court deemed
the exclusion of pregnancy from disability benefits as an issue of insurance
coverage,14 in essence avoiding the question of discrimination altogether.
This became more evident when the Court next considered insurance
coverage for spouses of male employees.15 The Court’s choice to focus on
coverage worked because there was no overt declaration of discrimination
against women, and the coverage decision was theoretically based on cost.16
Because only fools would articulate a policy to discriminate overtly, what
decisions like Phillips and Gilbert have done is to drive the discrimination
underground where it now thrives covertly.17 But, the reality is that even if
the Court had applied sex plus to the claim in Gilbert, the claim would have
failed because there was no comparator class of pregnant men.
Over time, as gender discrimination has become less overt, the power
of sex plus as a tool to demonstrate discrimination has become less potent.
factual contexts even though the holding had been overruled); Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp.
867, 869 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (“While breast-feeding, like pregnancy, is a uniquely female attribute,
excluding breast-feeding from those circumstances for which Pyro will grant personal leave is not
impermissible gender-based discrimination, under the principles set forth in Gilbert.” (citing Nashville
Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977)). The court in Wallace found that Title VII and the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act were not applicable to plaintiff’s situation. Id.
12. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544.
13. See Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 310–11 (deciding that plaintiff had failed to establish a
prima facie case of gender-plus discrimination because there was no comparator class of men).
14. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135.
15. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
16. Id. at 682.
17. But apparently some “fools” remain, as some employers continue to perpetuate stereotypes
about mothers’ roles overtly, and to the extent that they do, it appears that Title VII adequately addresses
their actions. See, e.g., Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1042–43 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that an
employee’s supervisor made statements such as “Oh, my God, she’s pregnant again,” “you’re not
coming back after this baby,” and when she was fired, “[h]opefully this will give you some time to
spend at home with your children”). Many of these cases deal with an individual’s preconceived notions
and not institutional prejudices that may be more subtle.

330

Vermont Law Review

[Vol. 36:327

But, when trying to address subtle forms of discrimination against women,
what if the courts recognized same-sex comparators as an appropriate group
when the “plus” characteristic is related to motherhood or to other
characteristics that are uniquely female, or even do away with comparators
altogether and focus solely on “mother” as equivalent to female? Such a
question sits atop a “persistent ‘fault line between work and family—
precisely where sex-based overgeneralization has been and remains
strongest.’”18 The question is twofold—is stereotyping about mothers a
form of gender discrimination, and can such discrimination “be determined
in the absence of evidence about how the employer in question treated
fathers[?]”19
Shifting to a same-sex comparator has become necessary to address the
concept of gender discrimination and motherhood because it is rare these
days for women to experience the type of blatant discrimination at issue in
Phillips.20 After forty-plus years of Title VII, thirty years of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, and nearly twenty years with the Family Medical Leave
Act, the kind of discrimination that remains is based upon the social
construct of the workplace and it is far more insidious. It results in women
being “mommy tracked” or subject to the “maternal wall” because of our
social perceptions of the appropriate roles of mothers as primary caregivers
and the corresponding norms that have emerged in the workplace.21 This, of
course, is in addition to the “glass ceiling” that many women contend with
in the workplace already.22 “[N]otions that mothers are insufficiently
devoted to work, and that work and motherhood are incompatible, are
properly considered to be, themselves, gender-based.”23 Thus, stereotypical
remarks about mothers and employer action based on social misconceptions
18. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2004)
(quoting Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738 (2003)).
19. Id.
20. Although such discrimination is not as uncommon as one might hope. See Bailey v. ScottGallaher, 480 S.E.2d 502, 503 (Va. 1997) (discussing an employer’s assertion after a mother’s return
from maternity leave that a mother’s place was in the home with her child).
21. MARY C. STILL, CTR. FOR WORK LIFE LAW, UNIV. OF CAL. HASTINGS COLL. OF LAW,
LITIGATING THE MATERNAL WALL: U.S. LAWSUITS CHARGING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WORKERS
WITH FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES 4 (2006). The term “maternal wall” first appeared in the 1990s. Id. at 4.
It was used in part to explain the problem of pay disparity between men and women. Id. It reflects that
there remains a “motherhood penalty” in terms of salary that did not disappear as more and more women
entered the workforce. Id. It has become used more broadly in recent years to encompass issues related
to motherhood, including caregiving and continuing stereotypes about the roles of women as employees
versus mothers. Id.
22. See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family
Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 98–101 (2003)
(discussing the interaction of the glass ceiling with the maternal wall and the compounding of the
problem that results from gender stereotyping on two levels).
23. Back, 365 F.3d at 121.
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about mothers and their role within the family should be considered
evidence of gender discrimination, not just evidence of parental
discrimination requiring a comparator class of fathers to prove.24
Instead of allowing this to continue, why not take a small step toward
removing this barrier to maintaining a claim under Title VII and allow a
woman to state a claim when she can demonstrate that, as a mother, she has
been treated less favorably than others, regardless of the gender of the
comparator class?25 When one begins with the understanding that women as
a group still suffer discrimination and inequality in the workplace, it makes
little sense to compare women with men in looking at distinctly female
issues. Until the courts start drilling down into these subsets of working
women who are subject to discrimination, we will not achieve true parity in
the workplace.26
In practice, a reconceived sex-plus test, where comparators become
meaningful for the discrimination being targeted or where comparators are
perhaps no longer necessary, may be the exception, but it may be as
valuable as the legal concept of piercing the corporate veil when a
corporation is trying to end-run rules by hiding behind a corporate fiction.27
It favors equity and honoring the spirit as well as the letter of Title VII.28
24. There is an increasing attention to stereotyping in demonstrating discrimination against
both male and female caregivers. Termed family-responsibilities discrimination, it utilizes various legal
theories to address discrimination against employees who are also caregivers. As a parent and caregiver,
the man or woman is treated differently than the opposite sex based upon stereotyping. This is not the
focus of this Article but is clearly related to the conversation herein. Lawsuits involving familyresponsibilities discrimination encompass claims of gender stereotyping, sex-plus discrimination,
pregnancy discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, disparate treatment, disparate impact,
interference with Family Medical Leave Act rights, ERISA, and the ADA. STILL, supra note 21, at 6.
Unlike this broader approach, this Article focuses solely on Title VII claims using a sex-plus theory of
discrimination and argues that a woman’s status as a mother can be considered gender discrimination as
long as she can show that she is being treated differently than other women. Inherent in such a claim is
the recognition that stereotyping is at play but that it is not as obvious as direct discrimination. Thus, this
Article seeks to address a more discrete component of family responsibilities discrimination.
25. As a practical matter, this would also allow mothers to maintain claims under Title VII
based on discrimination against them as breastfeeding mothers.
26. While the broader themes of equality, feminism, corrective legislation, and social discourse
serve as an important context and background for this conversation, the competing theories, opinions,
and suggestions are beyond the scope of the Article. Instead, the Author hopes to invite a discussion
about smaller incremental changes that can be made within the existing legal framework to recognize
our differences in a way that continues to promote formal equality.
27. Piercing the corporate veil is a judicially created doctrine that seeks to do equity by
removing limited-liability protection from those who abuse the protection the law offers. See generally
CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER , LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS
LAW ¶ 6.03 (2011) (citing Kaycee Land & Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323, 326–27 (Wy. 2002); RCO
Int’l Corp. v. Clevenger, 904 N.E.2d 941 (Ohio App. 2008)). “[E]quity will not [permit] a corporate veil
to cover fraud or injustice . . . .” Sullivan v. Sullivan, 54 So. 3d 520, 523 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (first
alteration in original) (quoting Plank v. Arban, 241 So. 2d 198, 200 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1970)). Courts
apply this doctrine to reach beyond what may be a carefully crafted legal façade to address injustice or
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However, in order to do this, it is not enough to reconsider the
requirements of Phillips and Gilbert and advance them one step further.
Instead, the courts must recognize that being a mother is distinct from being
a parent.29 Like breastfeeding, it is something that is wholly female and has
intrinsic value.30 Part II of this Article will address gender-specific traits,
specifically the concept of mother, and the fact that equality under Title VII
encompasses protection of such a concept from gender discrimination. Part
III will discuss the evolution of the sex-plus doctrine from the inception of
Title VII to today. Part IV will suggest a new way of constructing the sexplus doctrine to root out and prevent more subtle discrimination against
mothers in the workplace.
I. STATING THE OBVIOUS: WOMEN ARE DIFFERENT AND MOTHERS ARE
DIFFERENT, BUT WOMEN ARE MOTHERS
In 1943, transportation managers were offered advice on how to deal
with women in the workplace during World War II.31 The advice mirrored
some of the misconceptions of the time:
Give . . . female employee[s] a definite day-long schedule
of duties so that they’ll keep busy without bothering the
management for instructions every few minutes. Numerous
properties say that women make excellent workers when they
have their jobs cut out for them, but that they lack initiative in
finding work themselves.
fraud that might otherwise go unremedied. In a similar way, asking courts to look beyond the legal
constructs of “male” and “female” in gender discrimination suits can address injustices that might
otherwise go unpunished, and it would further the purpose of Title VII.
28. It may also offer support for family-caregiver suits so that they can move beyond claims
based solely on gender stereotyping.
29. Part of this recognition is based on mother as primary caregiver. While this same argument
could be extended to men who are primary caregivers, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this
article. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Suit by Fired Associate Claims Dechert’s Macho Culture
Punished Paternity Leave, A.B.A. J., Dec. 16, 2010, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/suit_by_
fired_associate_claims_decherts_macho_culture_punished_paternity_le_/ (discussing a male attorney’s
primary-caregiver discrimination claim against his employer). Instead, within the confines of Title VII,
this Article seeks ways to address subtle discrimination against a class of persons—women—who also
happen to be mothers. Many of those affected by this type of discrimination have not sought
accommodation in the workplace but instead have been “mommy tracked” simply because they are
mothers.
30. While there is no obvious biological component, such as pregnancy or breastfeeding, I
would argue it is in the same vein. The mother-child connection has to do with caregiving and a
biological need to be attached.
31. 1943 Guide to Hiring Women, SAAVY & SAGE, Sept./Oct. 2007, at 16 (featuring an excerpt
from the July 1943 issue of Transportation Magazine written for male supervisors of women in the
workforce during World War II).
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....
Be tactful when issuing instructions or in making
criticisms. Women are often sensitive; they can’t shrug off harsh
words the way men do. Never ridicule a woman - it breaks her
spirit and cuts off her efficiency.32

These types of misconceptions continued, even beyond enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Prior to 1970, several airlines had “motherhood”
restrictions in place that required female flight attendants with children,
even those that had adopted children, to be grounded or resign.33 In
defending their policies, airlines justified them because “mothers of young
children would have unacceptably high rates of absenteeism, . . . mothers
might be subject to overriding domestic concerns that would make them
questionable risks for competent performance in times of crisis,
and . . . mothers returning from maternity leaves of absence would require
expensive retraining.”34 In justifying their discriminatory treatment, the
airlines acknowledged that “mothers” were different. However, there was
no corresponding policy against fathers of young children. If mothers were
fathers, there would be no concern about job performance or domestic
responsibilities. Indeed, the policy perpetuated the stereotype that only
mothers could satisfy the needs of their young children and such an
obligation would necessarily interfere with a mother’s work outside the
home.
While we would like to think that we have come a long way, even from
the early 1970s, the truth is that many of these stereotypical generalizations
remain. In the late 1990s, Joann Trezza alleged that her supervisors made
disparaging remarks about the “incompetence and laziness of women who
are also working mothers” and that “working mothers cannot be both good
mothers and good workers, stating, ‘I don’t see how you can do either job
well.’”35 Thus, even at the turn of the twenty-first century, employers
continued to cling to the idea that working mothers in the workplace were
simply different and less valuable. The idea that they are still different is

32. Id.
33. In re Consol. Pretrial Proceedings in Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1978).
TWA maintained a policy of removing female flight attendants during pregnancy and after a child was
born. Id. Any mothers were terminated permanently if they refused to accept ground-duty positions, but
the policy did not apply to male flight attendants. Id.
34. Id. at 1145. These reasons were provided in support of establishing a bona fide
occupational qualification. Id.
35. Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 2205, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 30, 1998).
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not based just on gender but on the social concept of what the role of a
mother is and how it differs from other caregiving obligations.36
There are two different kinds of stereotyping that occur with respect to
a woman’s role as a mother. Prescriptive stereotyping involves statements
about how a woman should behave, i.e., a mother should be at home with
her children, while descriptive stereotyping involves how women tend to
behave or appear.37 Both have an impact on how mothers are perceived in
the workplace and both have legal significance.38 Gender stereotyping for
mothers tends to occur at one of three points in time: when a woman
becomes pregnant, when she becomes a mother, or when she asks for a
reduced or more flexible work schedule.39 At that point, there can be a shift
in perception from viewing an accomplished employee as a “highcompetence business woman” to viewing her as a “low-competence
caregiver.”40 The inherent problem with this prejudicial thinking is that

36. In fact, much of the commentary surrounding working mothers these days is that they
cannot “have it all.” Barnard & Rapp, supra note 1, at 229–30. But many would suggest that it is not that
working mothers cannot have it all, it is that they are redefining what it means to work and be a mother
in the new millennium. See BECKY BEAUPRE GILLESPIE & HOLLEE SCHWARTZ TEMPLE, GOOD ENOUGH
IS THE NEW PERFECT: FINDING HAPPINESS AND SUCCESS IN MODERN MOTHERHOOD, at ix (2011).
Regardless of how this debate is framed, it still does not excuse outmoded stereotypes or discrimination
against mothers in the workplace. Instead, moving away from stereotypes to individual performance and
situations is necessary to finally remove this type of discrimination from the workplace.
37. Williams & Segal, supra note 22, at 94–96 (citing Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of
Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Diana Burgess & Eugene Borgida, Who Women Are, Who Women Should
Be: Descriptive and Prescriptive Gender Stereotyping in Sex Discrimination, 5 PSYCH. PUB. POL’ Y &
L. 665 (1999)); see also Kerri Lynn Stone, Clarifying Stereotyping, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 591, 616, 620
(2011) (positing that, with respect to employment decisions, the “tendency to regard someone through
the lens of their [sic] protected class status [e.g., women or Latinos] and not as an individual for whom
individual facts and attributes can be discerned based upon experience often belies one’s vulnerability to
prejudicial thinking”).
38. Gender stereotyping in the workplace occurs when an employer “assumes that the worker
will behave a certain way because of his or her gender, or makes negative assumptions if the worker
does something consistent with a gender role despite his or her individual performance.” CTR. FOR
WORK LIFE LAW, U NIV. OF CAL. H ASTINGS COLL. OF LAW, I SSUE BRIEF: CURRENT LAW PROHIBITS
DISCRIMINATION BASED ON FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES & GENDER STEREOTYPING 2 (2006) [hereinafter
ISSUE BRIEF]. For example, such discrimination assumes that a mother who arrives to work late or
leaves early is doing so because she has childcare issues or expresses the belief that mothers belong at
home with their children. Id.
39. Alison A. Reuter, Subtle But Pervasive: Discrimination Against Mothers and Pregnant
Women in the Workplace, 33 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1369, 1410 (2006) (citing Debbie N. Kaminer, The
Work-Family Conflict: Developing a Model of Parental Accommodation in the Workplace, 54 AM. U. L.
REV. 305, 314 (2004)).
40. Id. (quoting Kaminer, supra note 39, at 314). In one instance, one lawyer who returned
from maternity leave felt the need to exclaim “I had a baby, not a lobotomy” when she returned to work
and was given work normally assigned to paralegals. Barnard & Rapp, supra note 1, at 235. Another
author has noted that viewing child-rearing as “mother’s work” has “exact[ed] significant career costs”
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[w]hile . . . government cannot outlaw stereotypical beliefs,
cognizance of those beliefs and recognizing how deep-rooted or
far-reaching they may be is the only way in which to accurately
ferret out certain instances of disparate treatment on the basis of
protected class status. And that is the end game in employment
discrimination jurisprudence.41

The reality is that women comprise nearly half of the work force in the
United States.42 Of those women, nearly 60% are mothers.43 Even though
they comprise nearly half of the workforce and a majority of women will
become mothers during their careers, women are still marginalized in the
workplace as a gender.44 Women still earn salaries that are about 80% of
what men earn in comparable jobs.45 Fewer women hold managerial
positions and are in higher-level positions.46 Women are still subject to the
“glass ceiling,” the “mommy track,” and the “maternal wall,” which are all
tied to a woman’s gender and gender roles rather than her ability. As a
group, they still struggle with gender stereotyping, wrestling with the
supposition that they “will conform to a gender stereotype” as well “as to
the supposition that [they are] unqualified for a position because [they do]
not conform to a gender stereotype.”47
for female lawyers. See Korzec, supra note 6, at 117 (noting that access to the legal profession has not
translated into gender equality within the profession).
41. Stone, supra note 37, at 621 (emphasis omitted).
42. EEOC, U NLAWFUL DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS WITH CAREGIVING
RESPONSIBILITIES 1 (2007) [hereinafter EEOC G UIDANCE], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/
docs/caregiving.pdf. Eighty-two percent of all women become mothers and statistics indicate that
married women spend nearly twice as much time per day on childcare than married men. ISSUE BRIEF,
supra note 38, at 3; see also BECKY PETTIT & JENNIFER L. H OOK, G ENDERED TRADEOFFS: FAMILY,
SOCIAL POLICY, AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN TWENTY-O NE COUNTRIES 21 (2009).
43. EEOC G UIDANCE, supra note 42, at n.4.
44. See PETTIT & HOOK, supra note 42, at 21. Pettit and Hook noted that “women still have not
reached parity with men on most economic indicators in most countries.” Id. Specifically, research
indicates that “women are less likely to be employed than men,” that they are “underrepresented in the
most highly paid occupations,” and that they still earn less than men. Id.
45. Women’s-to-Men’s Earnings Ratio by Age, 2009, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS
(July 8, 2010), http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/print.pl/opub/ted/2010/ted_20100708.htm; see also PETTIT &
HOOK, supra note 42, at 21 (stating that women “still earn between 50 and 90 percent of men’s wages”).
46. PETTIT & H OOK, supra note 42, at 21.
47. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 119 (2d Cir. 2004)
(citing Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 44–45, 57 (2d Cir. 2000)) (applying the principles
first stated in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)). Price Waterhouse involved a female
plaintiff who was refused a partnership for being perceived as too assertive and abrasive. One partner
even suggested “charm school.” The case stands for the proposition that gender stereotypes about
feminine versus masculine characteristics and their desirability in the workplace can constitute gender
discrimination. 490 U.S. at 235, 250; see Back, 365 F.3d at 119 (quoting Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 57–58
(Cardamone, J., dissenting)) (concluding that Price Waterhouse applies whether the stereotype is that
the plaintiff is too feminine or too masculine because in both cases employers demand that the plaintiff
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When these limitations are applied to a clearly protected status
applicable to all women—gender—then legal redress is available to a
woman.48 However, if a woman is a mother as well, she becomes a member
of a sub-class of women who may be subject to distinct and additional
discrimination based on a characteristic that is uniquely female but not
legally recognized as “immutable” or “fundamental.” If a woman cannot
present a clear case of stereotyping to satisfy a case of direct discrimination,
she may never be able to demonstrate that she is suffering discrimination
based on her status as a mother.
The fact that there is a “mommy track” demonstrates that mothers are
different and are treated differently.49 There is no comparable “daddy
track.”50 In fact, as Korzec noted, “the joint status of husband and father
increases a man’s desirability as a worker as he is regarded as more stable
and mature than his childless, bachelor counterpart. Conversely, the mere
status of motherhood diminishes the value of women employees in the eyes
of employers.”51
The “mommy track” arose as a concept over twenty years ago.52 The
idea was that women could choose a slower career track in order to

perform one of these but perceive the roles as fundamentally incompatible). The other problem mothers
face is the stereotype of the “ideal” worker. The ideal worker has no caregiving responsibilities, is able
to work a minimum of forty hours a week year-round, and can work overtime with little or no notice.
Reuter, supra note 39, at 1411 (citing Kaminer, supra note 39, at 314). It is modeled on a male
employee and reflects an outdated version of the nuclear family. Id.
48. Claims of gender discrimination are clearly cognizable under Title VII. EEOC GUIDANCE,
supra note 42, at 2.
49. It also recognizes that despite advances and shifting expectations, “women continue to be
most families’ primary caregivers.” Id. However, some feminists cast the term “mothering” as
“concrete, sometimes monotonous and mundane work performed in caring for children.” Korzec, supra
note 6, at 123 (citing Susan Rae Peterson, Against Parenting, in MOTHERING: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST
THEORY 62–64 (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 1983)). However, “fathering” connotes something less than childnurturing. Id. Either way, these roles are often identified as distinct. Id. (citing ADRIENNE RICH, OF
WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 12–13 (1976)).
50. Although, perhaps there should be. As we continue to evolve and move away from the
more traditional roles fitted on men and women, more men are opting to scale back as well and
contribute to family caregiving more than in the past. EEOC G UIDANCE, supra note 42, at 4 (citing
Donna St. George, Fathers Are No Longer Glued to Their Recliners, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2007, at
A11; Karen L. Brewster & Bryan Giblin, Explaining Trends in Couples’ Use of Fathers as Childcare
Providers, 1985–2002, at 2–3 (2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Vermont Law Review)).
51. Korzec, supra note 6, at 126 (citing Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEX.
L. REV. 1047, 1047–48 (1994); Nancy E. Dowd, Family Values and Valuing Families: A Blueprint for
Family Leave, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335, 364 (1993)).
52. Postrel, supra note 4. The term was coined after Felice Schwartz published an article in the
Harvard Business Review in 1989 entitled “Management Women and the New Facts of Life.” Id.; see
Felice N. Schwartz, Executives and Organizations: Management Women and the New Facts of Life,
HARV. BUS. REV., Jan./Feb. 1989, at 65, 70 (proposing an altered career track for women who desired to
both work and support a family).
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accommodate family obligations and balance both worlds.53 Even at that
time, Schwartz recognized that not all professional women were alike. 54
Schwartz argued that there was value in building flexibility into the
workplace to retain talented and creative women who would otherwise exit
the workforce or accept less career growth.55 Schwartz’s article was
prescient, and the “mommy track,” for better or worse, has remained a
constant in women’s career development. Even if a woman avoids the
“mommy track” or tries to exit it at some point, she may still end up
running right into the “maternal wall.”56 A woman hits the maternal wall
when she suffers discrimination as a result of her role as a mother, rather
than her sex.57
II. TITLE VII AND THE EVOLUTION OF SEX-PLUS THEORY IN GENDER
DISCRIMINATION
A. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 created “simple but
momentous”58 protection from discrimination in the workplace based on
gender.59 “The simplicity of the original statutory scheme indicated a
Congressional assessment of discrimination in 1964 as an important issue
and an unacceptable practice, but also as a simple and obvious occurrence
that could be easily remedied.”60 The intent was to “prevent employers from
refusing ‘to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations of the
sexes.’”61 Even the most restrictive reading of the legislative history
53. See Schwartz, supra note 52, at 69.
54. Postrel, supra note 4.
55. Id.
56. See STILL, supra note 21, at 4.
57. Id. at 5.
58. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (“In passing Title VII, Congress
made the simple but momentous announcement that sex . . . [was] not relevant to the selection,
evaluation, or compensation of employees.”).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). Under Title VII, it is an unlawful employment practice to
discriminate against a person in the workplace based upon race, color, religion, gender, or national origin
with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. The act provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin . . . .
Id. § 2000e-2(a).
60. Kathryn Branch, Note, Are Women Worth As Much As Men?: Employment Inequities,
Gender Roles, and Public Policy, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L & POL’ Y 119, 146 (1994).
61. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a)(1)(ii) (1971)). Justice Marshall observed that “[e]ven characteristics of
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indicates a congressional desire to eradicate employment decisions that
were based on gender instead of job qualifications.62 While job-related
criteria or qualifications serve as a permissible basis for discrimination, they
are not permissible to the extent that they permit discrimination on the basis
of gender.63
Early problems arose when it became apparent that some job-related
criteria or qualifications related to employment were, by their very nature,
discriminatory with respect to gender.64 Thus, in response to one such
instance, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) to
specifically extend Title VII’s protection to women with respect to
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.65 “Legislative history
accompanying passage of the PDA provided that ‘[t]he entire
thrust . . . behind [that] legislation [was] to guarantee women the basic right
to participate fully and equally in the workforce, without denying them the
fundamental right to full participation in family life.’”66 Clearly, pregnancy
could be a separate criterion, but there was an underlying recognition that
such a criterion was gender-specific. The problem is that since 1978,
Congress has failed to take additional steps to recognize similar criteria as
gender-specific, and the courts have only extended Title VII minimally to
address some more subtle versions of gender-specific discrimination
cloaked in seemingly gender-neutral qualifications. The one small step
forward was the enactment of a new subsection in section 703 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.67 To establish liability under the Act, a claimant must
the proper domestic roles of the sexes were not to serve as predicates for restricting employment
opportunity.” Id. at 545.
62. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 243–44.
63. Id. at 244.
64. Even before these problems arose, proponents of protection for women were stymied by
reports that the addition of “sex” to the law was a fluke and that the EEOC’s apparent lack of interest in
enforcing that part of the Act was based on the lack of legislative history. See generally Rachel
Osterman, Origins of a Myth: Why Courts, Scholars, and the Public Think Title VII’s Ban on Sex
Discrimination was an Accident, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 409, 416–24 (2009).
65. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (current version
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)). The pertinent language provides that the “terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on
the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act was enacted with the express purpose of overturning the United States Supreme
Court ruling in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). See Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 670 (1983) (noting that Congress decided to overrule the
decision in Gilbert by amending Title VII to prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy).
66. Barnard & Rapp, supra note 1, at 238 (alterations in original) (quoting 123 CONG. REC.
29,658 (1977)).
67. The new subsection provided that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an
unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
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only show that discrimination was a contributing factor in an employment
decision and the employer no longer gets an out if it can demonstrate that it
would have made the same decision based on non-discriminatory reasons
where the same employment decision was made, in part, for a
discriminatory reason.68 To a large extent, however, “the law’s response to
the tension between women’s work and family responsibilities has been
minimal and slow.”69
B. The Evolution of Sex-Plus Discrimination Theory
1. Flight Attendants Pave the Way
In the late 1960s, shortly after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
several charges were filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) alleging that airlines were discriminating against
female flight attendants on the basis of sex.70 At the heart of the dispute was
whether certain airline policies, such as terminating or reassigning a female
flight attendant upon marriage or pregnancy, or when she attained a certain
age, were bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQ) or simple gender
discrimination.71 The airlines asserted that employing married stewardesses
“would lead to operational and administrative problems, would tend to
produce a deterioration in service, and would cause marital difficulties for
the stewardesses.”72 While the airlines pointed to scheduling concerns and
factors also motivated the practice.” Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a), Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). This change in civil rights was made in direct
response to Price Waterhouse. Toni Scott Reed, Flight Attendant Furies: Is Title VII Really the Solution
to Hiring Policy Problems?, 58 J. AIR L. & COM. 267, 337 (1992) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(II), at 2
(1991)).
68. Reed, supra note 67, at 338. The Supreme Court later held that such a claim did not require
the presentation of direct evidence; rather, a mixed-motive claim could create a jury question when
sufficient circumstantial evidence existed for a jury to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that
a protected status was a motivating factor in an employment practice. Desert Palace, Inc., v. Costa, 539
U.S. 90, 101 (2003).
69. Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s
Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371,
391 (2001).
70. Neal v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 1973 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 4010 (June 20, 1968). At the
time, the position was also referred to as stewardess or hostess.
71. Id. at 4012. A bona fide occupational qualification is a defense an employer may raise
when a policy or qualification is otherwise discriminatory. Thus, if there is a valid BFOQ, such
discrimination is permissible because it is “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). Analysis of a BFOQ requires that the
standard be related to the essence of the job, a factual basis for believing a person in the excluded class
would be unable to perform the job, and an inability to deal with members of the excluded class on an
individual basis. Reed, supra note 67, at 340.
72. Neal, 1973 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 4013.
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balancing demands of work and home, there was also a specific concern
that since “our society places the responsibility for homemaking and
childrearing on women, married women’s absences from home would be
more likely to put a strain on family harmony than similar absences by
married men for business reasons; . . . [S]tewardesses’ absences on flights
would, therefore, cause marital disharmony.”73
In Neal v. American Airlines, the EEOC found that the practice of
terminating an airline stewardess after she married was unlawful sex
discrimination under Title VII.74 American Airlines had terminated
stewardesses based on marriage since 1935.75 The EEOC held that
[t]he concept of discrimination based on sex does not require an
actual disparity of treatment among male and female employees
presently in the same job classification. It is sufficient that a
company policy or rule is applied to a class of employees
because of their sex, rather than because of the requirements of
76
the job.

Interestingly, the EEOC specifically stated that the discriminatory policy
could not be remedied by simply applying the rule to male flight attendants.
The Commission observed that “[d]iscrimination based on sex unrelated to
job performance is not to be eliminated by applying the same irrelevant
conditions to members of the opposite sex.”77
In Colvin v. Piedmont Aviation, the airline instituted a no-marriage
policy in 1962 when it began hiring female flight attendants.78 The airline
had previously employed only male flight attendants, and it did not have a
no-marriage policy for those attendants, nor did the new no-marriage policy
apply to the male flight attendants who remained after 1962.79 As in Neal,

73. Id. at 4013 n.11. Interestingly, the evolution of women as stewardess entered a new phase
after World War II. Reed, supra note 67, at 270–71. At that time, airlines moved toward the “sex object”
criteria for hiring flight attendants. Id. at 271. In addition to height, weight, and age standards, strict
standards of appearance were imposed. Id. The “flying ‘playboy experience’ and the ‘Hefner-esque’
atmosphere” became the model for the industry according to some critics. Id. (citing THOMAS M.
ASHWOOD, THIS IS YOUR CAPTAIN SPEAKING: A HANDBOOK FOR AIR TRAVELERS 103 (1974); Franklin
Nachman, Hiring, Firing, and Retiring: Recent Developments in Airline Labor and Employment Law,
53 J. AIR L. & COM . 31, 51–56 (1987)).
74. Neal, 1973 Emp’t Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 4015; see also Colvin v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc.,
1973 Empl. Prac.Dec. (CCH) 4016 (June 20, 1968).
75. Neal, 1973 Emp’t Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 4011.
76. Id. at 4014.
77. Id. at 4015.
78. Colvin, 1973 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 4016.
79. Id.
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the Commission found that such a policy was related to sex and that
reasonable cause existed to believe Piedmont’s policy violated Title VII.80
The decisions in Neal and Colvin conflicted with an earlier ruling in
Cooper v. Delta Airlines.81 Eulalie Cooper filed suit after she was
terminated from her job as a flight attendant because she married.82 The
district court found that Delta, which only hired females as stewardesses,
could in its discretion hire only stewardesses who were “single and young,
20 to 26 years of age, average height, 5’2” to 5’6”, slim, not more than 135
pounds, educated, at least two years of college” along with “good
complexions,” “neat,” “attractive,” and of good moral character.83 Delta’s
basis for these requirements was that single women made better
stewardesses than married women because passengers accepted them more
readily, flight scheduling was easier, and there was less likelihood of
pregnancy.84 The district court held that Congress did not include marital
status in Title VII.85 Thus, Delta could discriminate based on marital status
without offending Title VII.86
The interesting thing about the flight attendant cases of the late 1960s,
other than revealing some amazing stereotypes and gender-defining roles, is
that these cases dealt with discrimination against women where often the
only other class comparator was other women. That is not to say that these
cases contemplated the fact that a sub-class of women were being treated
differently than other women; indeed, these cases ignored that concept
altogether and simply found that Title VII did not cover “plus”
requirements.87 Only the EEOC acknowledged that a proper reading of Title
VII required an adjudicatory body to look beyond the “plus” and determine
how it related to the protected class in question.88 These cases set the stage
for what came next, a shift to sex plus as a viable theory under Title VII.
80. Id. at 4018.
81. Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. La. 1967).
82. Id. at 781.
83. Id. at 782.
84. Id.; see Comment, Marital Restrictions on Stewardesses: Is This Any Way to Run an
Airline?, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 616, 618–19 (1969) (criticizing the logic used by the court in allowing
these reasons to stand).
85. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. at 783. By extension, the district court indicated that every other
requirement recited by Delta would not violate Title VII as well. Id.
86. Id. The district court did not find that Delta’s requirements would have been BFOQs, only
that the law did not protect on the basis of marriage. Id.
87. Interestingly, at least one later case took on the sex-plus theory and applied it to flight
attendants. In Stroud v. Delta Airlines, Inc., the court found that because Delta only hired female flight
attendants, a woman who was fired after she married could not maintain a claim because there were no
married male flight attendants to serve as a comparator class. Instead, the court would be comparing
married and unmarried women, a distinction not protected under Title VII. 544 F.2d 892, 892 (5th Cir. 1977).
88. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1, 2 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated per curiam,
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
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2. The Supreme Court Adopts a Sex-Plus Theory of Discrimination
When Ida Phillips sued Martin Marietta Corporation for refusing to
hire her because she had pre-school age children, the question presented to
the Supreme Court was more than simply whether such a decision was
discriminatory, it was a question of how the protections afforded to women
under Title VII would unfold for the next several decades and how far that
protection could extend.
Ida Phillips sought employment at Martin Marietta as an assembly
trainee.89 At the time of her application, Martin Marietta had a policy
against hiring women with pre-school age children.90 The company would
hire women without pre-school age children and men with pre-school age
children.91 When she was refused employment, Phillips filed suit claiming
gender discrimination in violation of Title VII.92
The Fifth Circuit found that Phillips was not subject to illegal
discrimination because she was not refused employment based on her
gender.93 Instead, it was the “coalescence of . . . two elements”—she was a
woman and she had pre-school age children.94 In the court’s opinion, this
did not rise to the level of illegal discrimination because adding another
criterion removed the per se violation of Title VII.95
In his dissent from the denial of a petition for rehearing, Chief Judge
Brown reframed the matter more clearly:
The case is simple. A woman with pre-school children may not
be employed, a man with pre-school children may. The
distinguishing factor seems to be motherhood versus fatherhood.
The question then arises: Is this sex-related? To the simple query
the answer is just as simple: Nobody—and this includes Judges,
Solomonic or life tenured—has yet seen a male mother. A
mother, to oversimplify the simplest biology, must then be a
woman. It is the fact of the person being a mother—i.e., a
woman—not the age of the children, which denies employment
opportunity to a woman which is open to a man.96

89. Phillips, 411 F.2d at 2.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 4.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 3–4; Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257, 1260 (5th Cir. 1969) (Brown,
C.J., dissenting).
96. Phillips, 416 F.2d at 1259. Brown noted that the man would qualify even if he were a
single parent. Id. at n.5.
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In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit erred
in reading Title VII to permit one hiring policy for women with pre-school
age children and another policy for men with pre-school age children.97 The
Court remanded for further development of the record to determine whether
Martin Marietta could establish a BFOQ based on the existence of
conflicting family obligations that were “demonstrably more relevant to job
performance for a woman than for a man.”98 Justice Marshall observed that
while an employer could require all employees who are parents to meet
certain standards to ensure that caring for their children did not interfere
with employment, he could not agree that a BFOQ could be established “by
a showing that some women, even the vast majority, with pre-school-age
children have family responsibilities that interfere with job performance and
that men do not usually have such responsibilities.”99 Marshall was
concerned that the BFOQ defense would swallow the rule.100
Phillips has been construed to stand for the proposition that gender,
plus another characteristic, is a basis for a claim of illegal discrimination
under Title VII.101 The mere fact that the Supreme Court remanded this case
gave birth to this “sex plus” theory. How it has been interpreted since
Phillips is also telling. After Phillips, sex plus could be alleged as long as a
plaintiff could identify a comparator class of men.
In Gilbert, female employees filed suit against their employer claiming
sex discrimination based on the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities
from the employer’s disability plan.102 The Supreme Court held that Title
VII’s protection did not extend to pregnant women because a non-pregnant
woman did not suffer discrimination and there was no indication that the
denial of disability benefits was anything other than a decision not to cover
a specific physical condition.103 The Supreme Court reached this
remarkable conclusion even though the EEOC had interpreted Title VII to
protect pregnancy-related disabilities from discrimination.104 The majority
97. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
98. Id. Pursuant to section 703(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employer may
demonstrate that a facially discriminatory action is permissible because the condition is a “bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise.” Id. (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(e), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 256 (1964)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006)).
99. Id. at 544 (Marshall, J., concurring).
100. Id.
101. Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 66 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 1995), as amended 70 F.3d 1420, 1433 (2d Cir. 1995).
102. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 127 (1976).
103. Id. at 145–46.
104. The EEOC guideline, promulgated in 1972, provided that:
Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion,
childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary
disabilities and should be treated as such . . . . [Benefits] shall be applied to
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framed the issue as one where there was “no risk from which men are
protected and women are not” creating a neutral reason for omitting
pregnancy from disability protection.105
Essentially, the Supreme Court reviewed a discriminatory practice that
disproportionately affected the claimants due to gender and looked past the
protected status, choosing to focus solely on the other reason for
discrimination, without considering the blatant connection to the protected
status.106 The reality is that no pregnant man could complain because there
simply are none. Non-pregnant women may not have had a claim at that
moment, but clearly as a protected class they had an interest in the
application of Title VII to this claim.
3. Beyond Phillips and Gilbert: Modern Applications of Sex-Plus Theory
Currently, to plead sex plus as a theory of discrimination, a claimant
must allege that she is being treated differently than a comparable subclass
of the opposite sex.107 The “plus” must also be a fundamental right or an
immutable characteristic.108 Thus, according to the courts, childcare and
child-rearing are not sex-plus characteristics, but being a parent is an
appropriate characteristic.109 Marital status is also recognized as an
disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they
are applied to other temporary disabilities.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 140–41 (alteration in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975)). In coming
to its conclusion, the Supreme Court noted that the EEOC promulgated its interpretation some eight
years after passage of the law and that this guideline contradicted an earlier interpretation provided
closer to the time of Title VII’s enactment. Id. at 141–42.
105. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484, 496–97 (1974)). Geduldig held that there was no gender discrimination under the Fourteenth
Amendment for a similar disability insurance plan. Id.
106. Id. at 160.
107. Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y 1999).
108. Earwood v. Cont’l Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) (citing Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971)); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084,
1091 (5th Cir. 1975).
109. Guglietta v. Meredith Corp., 301 F. Supp. 2d 209, 214 (D. Conn. 2004) (citing Record v.
Mill Neck Manor Lutheran Sch., 611 F. Supp. 905, 907 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that child-rearing is
not a sex-plus characteristic protected by Title VII, the Pregnancy Disability Act, or any other federal
statutes); Barnes v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 846 F. Supp. 442, 445 (D. Md. 1994)). But see In re Consol.
Pretrial Proceedings in Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1145 (7th Cir. 1978), rev’d, 455 U.S. 385 (1982)
(using sex-plus theory to find that Transworld Airlines’ “no motherhood” policy was discriminatory on
its face); Piscottano v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 200, 212 n.5 (D. Conn. 2000) (stating that
gender-based assumptions about a mother’s role in childcare duties are questionable). Guglietta
involved an adverse employment action wherein a mother claimed her employer treated women with
children differently than men with children. 301 F. Supp. 2d at 211–12. However, the court reframed the
claim as one of a woman with “childcare difficulties” rather than merely a question of parental status. Id.
at 213–14. The court ultimately held that the shift change Guglietta was required to make did not rise to
the level of an adverse employment action. Id. at 215. The question remains whether the same result
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appropriate secondary characteristic for sex-plus discrimination cases.110
Prior to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, pregnancy was not an
appropriate secondary characteristic, but it now receives protected status as
a subset of gender.111 Breastfeeding, however, is still not an appropriate
secondary characteristic, nor is any other facet of motherhood other than a
woman’s status as a parent or her pregnancy and related medical
conditions.112
Using this theory, the Southern District of New York refused to
consider a breastfeeding mother’s claim of sex-plus discrimination because
there was no corresponding sub-class of breastfeeding men.113 The court
found that Martinez failed to state a prima facie claim of gender
discrimination because to hold otherwise would elevate breastfeeding to
protected status under Title VII.114
However, around the same time, the Southern District of New York
found that same-sex comparators could satisfy the first step of the
McDonnell Douglas 115 burden-shifting analysis.116 Trezza claimed that her
employer failed to promote her because she was a mother, instead
promoting less-qualified women without children or men who had

would have been reached where the “childcare difficulties” were perceived versus identified and where
the mother does not seek an accommodation as Guglietta did in her case.
110. See generally Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 66 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 1995), as amended 70 F.3d 1420
(2d Cir. 1995); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971). However, some courts
have even found that marital status ceases to be an appropriate comparator where there is no identifiable
group of men that are subject to the same policy. See Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 544 F.2d 892, 893
(5th Cir. 1977) (citing Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038, 1044 (3d Cir. 1973), vacated
on other grounds, 414 U.S. 970 (1973)).
111. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145–46; Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555,
92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)); see Newport News Shipbuilding
& Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 670 n.1 (1983).
112. Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 310–11; Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 869
(W.D. Ky. 1990), aff’d, 951 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1991). The court in Wallace viewed the employee’s
claim as one based on the desire to care for her child, not a medical reason related to her pregnancy and
childbirth. Id. The result was that a woman who gave birth and chose to breastfeed her infant was
afforded less protection under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act than a woman who had miscarried or
who chose to have an abortion.
113. Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 310–11.
114. Id. at 311. It seems to have escaped the district court’s notice that as a uniquely female
characteristic, foreclosing a claim on this basis creates a license for employers to discriminate based on
breastfeeding without any repercussions.
115. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Under this analysis, a
plaintiff must first make a prima facie showing of discrimination. Once the plaintiff does this, the
burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment
decision. If the employer satisfies this burden, then the claimant must demonstrate by a preponderance
of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the employer are only a pretext for discrimination. Id.
116. Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 2205, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, at *18 (S.D.N.Y
Dec. 30, 1998).
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children.117 She also alleged a hostile work environment based on
comments made by her managing attorneys such as “women are not good
planners, especially women with kids.”118
The court acknowledged that ultimately Trezza would have to prove
disparate treatment between men and women in order to prevail on a Title
VII claim.119 However, the court noted that such a burden arrives later in the
burden-shifting analysis.120 At the initial stage, where a court is merely
determining whether a plaintiff has stated a prima facie case, “the
defendant’s selection of someone of the same sex as plaintiff but without
the added characteristic is insufficient to defeat an otherwise legitimate
inference of discrimination—the essence of a plaintiff’s prima facie
case.”121 The court specifically noted that “a defendant should not be able to
escape liability for discrimination on the basis of sex merely by hiring some
members of the protected group.”122 The court did note, however, that
Trezza claimed she was treated differently than men with children as well
as women without children.123 That last detail was likely what saved
Trezza’s claim at the initial stages of the proceeding.
In a similar case, a mother of a child with disabilities was able to
maintain a Title VII claim under a sex-plus theory of discrimination where
she alleged that her job transfer was based on unfounded stereotypes about
mothers of disabled children and that a similar employment decision would
not have been made of a woman without a disabled child or a father with a
disabled child.124 The court found that McGrenaghan had established a
prima facie case because the woman who replaced her was less qualified,
not a mother of a disabled child, and not a member of the subclass, and
because she had “provided direct evidence of discriminatory animus against
working mothers and mothers with disabled children by the [p]rincipal” of
the school.125
117. Id. at *6–7. With respect to the specific positions discussed, women without children were
given the job, and men with children were offered one position but declined it. Id.
118. Id. at *5 (quoting Amended Complaint at 29, Trezza, No. 98 Civ. 2205 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1998)).
119. Id. at *16–17.
120. Id. at *17.
121. Id. at *17–18.
122. Id. (citing Graham v. Bendix Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (“The duty
not to discriminate is owed each minority employee, and discrimination against one of them is not excused
by a showing the employer did not discriminate against all of them, or there was one he did not abuse.”))
123. Trezza, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, at *19–20; see also King v. Trans World Airlines,
738 F.2d 255, 258–59 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that unlawful bias in the hiring process may be found
where a job interview included questions about pregnancy, childbearing, and childcare, which were not
regularly asked of either male of female applicants).
124. McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
125. Id. As in Trezza, the fact that fathers of disabled children were treated differently may have
influenced the court’s decision to rely on the replacement’s non-membership in the subclass to satisfy
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While cases like Trezza and McGrenaghan indicate that same-sex
comparators are acceptable on some level, they fail to take them beyond the
prima facie pleading stage. The question becomes why this type of
evidence cannot satisfy the pretext part of the analysis.126 Otherwise, the
policy reasons for not letting employers get away with more subtle
discrimination are not honored. In essence, an employer can always hire,
promote, or otherwise favor a woman without children and never run afoul
of Title VII, unless the employer favors men with children under the same
circumstances. This is more problematic when there is no obvious policy in
place, and the reason for the differing treatment is based on the fact that a
woman is a mother, not just a parent. An employer escapes liability for
discriminating against women by only discriminating against some women,
and the underlying reason is related solely to a woman’s gender and role as
a mother.
That was the case in Bass v. Chemical Banking Corp.127 where the
plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed because she failed to produce evidence
that demonstrated she was treated differently than married men or men with
children.128 Bass claimed that her responsibilities, ability to get promoted,
and working conditions began to shift after certain males were placed in her
direct line of supervision and after she took two separate maternity
leaves.129 Bass also alleged that her department and supervisors treated
female employees differently than male employees in terms of personal
interaction and social issues.130 When Bass was terminated, she was
replaced by another woman.131

McGrenaghan’s prima facie burden. It could well be that the direct evidence of discriminatory animus
also made this an easier call for the court.
126. In another case, the court allowed a claim of gender discrimination to survive summary
judgment, finding that the plaintiff had presented a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. This was
based on comments made by key decisionmakers at plaintiff’s company regarding her status as a mother
and her plans to have another child. Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46,
56–57 (1st Cir. 2000). Plaintiff also presented evidence that the legitimate reasons were after-the-fact
justifications. Id. at 56. In Santiago-Ramos, the court did not use the sex-plus construct but simply
viewed the claim as one of gender discrimination based upon impermissible stereotyping.
127. Bass v. Chem. Banking Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8833, 1996 WL 374151, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1996).
128. Id. at *6; see also Bruno v. City of Crown Point, 950 F.2d 355, 365 (7th Cir. 1991)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (recognizing that a hiring employee’s paternalistic questions directed only
to women could lead a jury to infer that this employee thought about women and men differently, which
could lead to an inference that the hiring decision was based on gender and the applicant’s role as a wife
and mother).
129. Bass, 1996 WL 374151, at *2–3. When Bass refused to sign a written warning about
attendance during working hours, she was terminated. Id. at *3.
130. Id. at *2.
131. Id. at *3. The promotion to Vice President that Bass was waiting for was also given to a
woman who was single and had no children.
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The court found that Bass could not state a prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas because a woman was promoted to the position central
to Bass’s failure-to-promote claim.132 Bass claimed discrimination based on
gender and marital or parental status, but the court would not allow her to
maintain this claim where her replacement was an unmarried woman with
no children.133 Given the environment at Chemical at the time of her failureto-promote claim, it seems even more untenable not to allow a claim to
proceed simply because management chose to promote a woman rather than
a man. Interestingly, the court acknowledged that the atmosphere in the
office could lead a rational factfinder to infer that Bass’s discharge was
motivated by gender.134 Ultimately, while Bass failed to survive summary
judgment on her failure-to-promote claim because of a lack of a male
comparator, her claim of discriminatory discharge survived because of the
environment in her office and an underlying claim of pretext.135
In Gee-Thomas v. Cingular Wireless, Heather Gee-Thomas applied for
two managerial positions for which she was arguably qualified.136 The
supervisor hiring for the second position asked if she really wanted to
travel, which she took as a question directed at her because she was the
mother of five children.137 A married man with children was hired for the
first position, and a single woman with no children was hired for the second
position.138 In her complaint, Gee-Thomas specifically claimed that she was
denied the first position because “male decisionmakers considered non-jobrelated criteria for women applicants that they did not consider for male
applicants, including family and marital status.”139 While the court
acknowledged that Thomas could satisfy the initial prongs of McDonnell
Douglas, the problem was that she could not demonstrate pretext where she
was as qualified as the man chosen, but not more qualified.140 Interestingly,
while the court allowed the claim of family and marital status to stand, it
did not acknowledge those reasons in its discussion of pretext.141
132. Id. at *5.
133. Id. The court found that “[a]t most, a rational factfinder could infer from the fact that
Chemical promoted a single woman with no children rather than Bass that Chemical discriminated
against married persons or persons with children, discrimination not prohibited by Title VII.” Id.
134. Id. at *6. The court noted that Bass’s contention that one supervisor, Briand, had difficulty
communicating with women, more readily socialized with male employees, including lunches and gettogethers at his home, and that he permitted male employees, but not female employees, to attend certain
conferences and seminars, would support such a claim. Id. at *1–2.
135. Id. at *7.
136. Gee-Thomas v. Cingular Wireless, 324 F. Supp. 2d 875, 878–79 (M.D. Tenn. 2004).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 881.
140. Id. at 886–88.
141. Id. at 884–88
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In two more recent cases, the courts addressed discriminatory
employment decisions that were allegedly based on a woman’s status as a
mother and how that related to gender discrimination.142 Elena Back
claimed that her supervisors denied her tenure based on their stereotyping
of her role as a mother.143 Although she had received strong reviews and
recommendations for tenure, she was questioned repeatedly about her
decision to continue to work in her position and be a mother.144 When she
was denied tenure, Back filed a § 1983 claim alleging that her constitutional
rights had been violated in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment.145
In reviewing Back’s complaint on a summary judgment motion, the
Second Circuit noted that “notions that mothers are insufficiently devoted
to work, and that work and motherhood are incompatible, are properly
considered to be, themselves, gender-based” stereotypes.146 On this basis,
the Second Circuit rejected the school’s argument that a comparator class of
fathers was necessary for Back to survive summary judgment, because “the
ultimate issue is the reasons for the individual plaintiff’s treatment, not the
relative treatment of different groups within the workplace. As a result,
discrimination against one employee cannot be cured, or disproven, solely
by favorable, or equitable, treatment of other employees of the
same . . . sex.”147 More importantly, the Second Circuit found that Back had
proffered enough evidence to survive summary judgment with respect to
the third stage of McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, pretext,
even where she was unable to offer a comparator class from the opposite

142. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2004);
Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-11977-DT, 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 25898, at
*13–14 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007).
143. Back, 365 F.3d at 115.
144. Id. Back’s supervisors asked how many more children she planned to have and when, and
they showed concern that if she received tenure, she would work fewer hours. They did not know how
she could do her job with children, and Back recalled that they wondered
whether my apparent commitment to my job was an act. They stated that once I
obtained tenure, I would not show the same level of commitment I had shown
because I had little ones at home. They expressed concerns about my child care
arrangements, though these had never caused me conflict with school
assignments.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. This type of claim requires that a plaintiff prove “purposeful or intentional discrimination
on the basis of gender.” Id. at 118 (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977)).
146. Id. at 121 (citing Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 733 n.5 (2003)). Hibbs
identified the stereotype that “women’s family duties trump those of the workplace” as a gender
stereotype. Id.
147. Id. at 121–22 (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001))
(“[S]tereotyping of women as caregivers can by itself and without more be evidence of an
impermissible, sex-based motive.”).
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sex that was treated differently.148 Thus, at least with respect to a direct
claim of gender discrimination, the Second Circuit was willing to recognize
that stereotyping a mother’s role was a valid claim of gender
discrimination, and even though other women at the school had children,
the issue focused on how Back herself was treated.149
However, in Philipsen v. University of Michigan Board of Regents,150
the court refused to allow a claim to proceed when a plaintiff could not
offer a comparator class of men with small children for the simple reason
that no men worked in the department.151 Philipsen filed suit against her
employer alleging sex-plus discrimination when her employer rescinded a
job offer because she was a woman with small children.152 Philipsen had
been working for the same department at the University part-time when the
full-time job offer was made.153 Philipsen’s supervisors were aware she had
small children and she asked questions about flexible scheduling and
working part-time at first to transition her children into new childcare.154
The employer claimed that Philipsen’s claim failed because she could not
identify male employees with young children who were treated
differently.155 The court observed that allowing this type of claim would
render the gender discrimination one of parental discrimination, which was
not appropriate.156
While the underlying facts of the Philipsen case may not have been as
compelling as those in Back, if they had been, Philipsen would have been
unable to maintain a claim. While the court chose to categorize the
discrimination as “parental,”157 it was actually gender-based discrimination
against women who are mothers.
III. WORKING TOWARD A MORE SOPHISTICATED SEX-PLUS THEORY OF
DISCRIMINATION
Commentators have observed that the rigidity of Title VII coupled with
narrow judicial interpretation of sex-plus theory limits the effectiveness of

148. Id. at 124.
149. Id. at 122.
150. Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-11977-DT, 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS
25898, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007).
151. Id. at *22.
152. Id. at *13–14.
153. Id. at *2, *7.
154. Id. at *3, *7–8.
155. Id. at *21.
156. Id. at *27.
157. Id. at *29.
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addressing discrimination suffered by women who are mothers.158 If the
discrimination cannot be tied to a biologically identifiable characteristic,
then the bridge to discrimination cannot be crossed. Instead, a mother is
stuck at an impasse. Clearly, there can be discrimination, and other forms of
discrimination based on outmoded stereotypes have diminished. The
question is why this type of gender discrimination lingers. As Chief Judge
Brown observed over forty years ago, “[a] mother is still a woman. And if
she is denied work outright because she is a mother, it is because she is a
woman. Congress said that could no longer be done.”159 While Judge
Brown was dealing with an outright denial of work, the idea should be
extended to more subtle discrimination. If a woman suffers discrimination
because she is a mother, then that should be sufficient to maintain a claim
under Title VII, and the burden should shift to an employer to justify its
conduct. It should not matter that women without children are not subject to
similar treatment; rather, the focus should be on the fact that the woman is
suffering because she is a mother.
A more sophisticated analysis of sex-plus discrimination will better
address intraclass preferences evidenced by stereotyping. Stone explains
that intraclass preferences allow an individual who has a prejudice against a
protected class, such as women, to “engage[] in discrimination within the
class, preferring those who do not conform to the stereotype of the class to
which he adheres.”160 In other words, the decisionmaker evaluates
candidates based on qualities that are set apart from their class.161
Intraclass-preference stereotyping is problematic because the
discrimination and preference exist within the protected class, limiting a
plaintiff’s ability to make a prima facie case and limiting the appearance of
discrimination if the selected candidate is a member of the same protected
class.162 These barriers to employment discrimination are equally as
applicable when a preference is given to women without children or a
woman with children is treated differently. The problem is, without the
ability to apply same-sex comparators in a sex-plus claim, or to make a
stereotyping claim without a comparator class, a mother is less likely to
158. Kessler, supra note 69, at 400. Kessler observed that women’s biological differences have
“become the outer limit to which employers can typically be held liable” because the requirement of the
presence of an immutable characteristic or fundamental rights “has rendered the success of sex-plus
caregiving claims highly unlikely.” Id. At the root of this observation is the fact that caregiving and the
status as a mother are not entirely biological but arguably have a biological component.
159. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257, 1262 (5th Cir. 1969) (Brown, C.J.,
dissenting).
160. Stone, supra note 37, at 622.
161. Id. Stone offers the example of hiring an African-American who a decisionmaker perceives
not to be “too” African-American.
162. Id. at 622–23.
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survive a summary judgment motion or be able to prove pretext if she does
survive summary judgment. Apparently, even the EEOC agrees that, at least
with respect to comments that reflect stereotypical views of women with
children, an inference of discrimination may be made in the absence of
comparative evidence about more favorable treatment of men with
children.163 While this helps mothers who can demonstrate direct evidence
of discriminatory animus, it would not help a woman who could only
demonstrate that women with children were treated differently than women
without children.
Given the breadth of this problem, there may be a question as to why
such a modest step is even useful. While this may be a valid point,
sometimes the “conventional wisdom of starting out with cases of modest
sweep, and building consensus that certain social practices, never before
seriously questioned, do in fact constitute illegal discrimination” can have
value.164 New legislation or a more expansive reading of Title VII or the
PDA would be just as helpful in moving toward a workplace that avoids
discrimination against mothers and recognizes each mother as an
individual. However, until such legislation is passed, adopting the idea that
same-sex comparators can serve to demonstrate disparate treatment, or,
even better, that comparators are unnecessary to demonstrate a sex-plus
claim because maternal discrimination is the same as gender discrimination,
would at least take another layer away from the core of the problem and
give women, and men, a more powerful legal tool.
Frankly, courts have allowed Title VII claims to involve parties in the
same protected class under other circumstances, so why not apply those
principles here to honor the spirit of Title VII? Clearly, women can
discriminate against other women on the basis of gender or pregnancy,165
women can sexually harass other women,166 and men can discriminate
163. EEOC G UIDANCE, supra note 61, at 21 n.43.
164. Williams & Segal, supra note 23, at 111. In that article, the author offered sexual
harassment as an example of such a case. The idea is to use mothers who are otherwise “ideal
workers”—who have not sought any real caregiving accommodations—to demonstrate that even they
have suffered disparate treatment because of their status as mothers. This can cause a ripple effect that
may broaden the reach of legal redress for other mothers in a broader pool of plaintiffs.
165. See, e.g., Walsh v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 332 F.3d 1150, 1154–55 (8th Cir. 2003)
(discussing how a woman supervisor discriminated against a woman worker after the worker returned
from maternity leave).
166. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (holding that
discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII); Richard F.
Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims After Oncale: Defining the Boundaries of Actionable
Conduct, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 677, 678 (1998). The Supreme Court in Oncale set forth three ways to
prove same-sex sexual harassment. First, a claimant may demonstrate that the “the harrasser is
homosexual (and thus presumably motivated by sexual desire).” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79. In Dick v.
Phone Directories Co., the Tenth Circuit even found that a plaintiff could establish same-sex sexual
harassment using this first method based on sexual desire even if the harasser was not a homosexual.
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against and sexually harass other men.167 The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal
evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions
of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we
are governed.”168 If this is the case, then why not accept that a same-sex
comparator class is appropriate, particularly where the class at issue is
actually a protected class under Title VII?
CONCLUSION
Recognizing the limitations of Title VII jurisprudence and sex-plus
discrimination and reevaluating how both can become relevant tools in
battling workplace discrimination against mothers is critical to the
continued evolution of gender equality in the workplace. As long as
negative stereotypes about mothers remain, it is imperative that steps be
taken to address those stereotypes to the extent that they impact a mother’s
ability to work. Developing more sophisticated legal tests to address more
subtle discrimination is necessary to continue to enforce the underlying
purposes of Title VII.

The court acknowledged the “possibility that an alleged harasser may consider herself ‘heterosexual’ but
nonetheless propose or desire sexual activity with another woman in a harassing manner.” 397 F.3d
1256, 1265 (10th Cir. 2005). The court looked beyond strict categorization and focused on the
underlying behavior that connected with the statute—harassment based on sexual desire—rather than
simply whether someone was of a certain sexual orientation. With the second method, a claimant must
demonstrate that the harassing behavior shows a general hostility to members of the same sex in the
workplace. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. Finally, a claimant may demonstrate that there is “direct comparative
evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace.” Id.
at 80–81.
167. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80–81; Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir.
2002) (finding that the holding in Oncale not only permits claims for same-sex sexual harassment but
that such conduct is actionable regardless of the victim’s real or perceived sexual orientation).
168. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.

